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' It is time that the European Union and Russia recognised their historical vocation as the two 
principal European powers and, in the common interest, sought to develop the close and 
mutually enriching partnership which will reflect their political, social and economic 
significance, while at the same time demonstrating the responsiveness and respect for human 
rights without which cooperation will remain unfulfilled and void of substance' (Com (95) 223 
final : 31.05.1995) 
Introduction 
The EUlRussian relationship is central to an understanding of the European Union's external 
capabilities and relations. While during the Cold War, the bipolar competition between the 
United States and the Soviet Union drove the European internal integration processes, the 
Post Cold War Era contains economic and political imperatives to integrate the new Europe in 
the international system. Especially in view of the immediate integration agenda of the 
European Union, its planned enlargement in Eastern Europe and its Association with the 
Baltic States, a consistent and constructive relationship to Russia is of crucial importance to 
the European Union. The interest for a constructive relationship with Russia is important not 
only because with Finland's accession it is the EU's immediate neighbour, but also because 
Russia, the EU's main trading partner exhibits enormous economic, commercial and scientific 
potential. Most important, Russia is and will continue to be a key player in the international 
political system, and thus will be a key contributor to the stability of the new European 
security architecture. 
The purpose of this article is to describe and explain the relationship between the 
European Union and Russia, focusing on the period following the 1991 break-up of the former 
Soviet Union. One issue which this article attempts to highlight is that the bilateral relationship 
which developed was shaped by Russia 's and the EU's perceptions of each other in the 
international system. A second argument is that the changes ofthe international system and the 
will of the member states to unifY and combine forces to follow a proactive dialogue with 
Russia gave the Commission an unprecedented opportunity to develop a genuine political 
dialogue with a third state. The nature and the concrete actions in the process of 
rapprochement between the European Union and Russia, could be tangible indicators of the 
development towards a genuine policy directed towards third states in the former Soviet 
Union, or, in other words, a new European Ostpolitik. 
Because the international system is no longer dominated by an ideologically divided 
East-West thinking as it was during the Cold War, the usage this term might seem to be 
inappropriate. I However, the reason why this term might be employed here is because one can 
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draw some useful analogies from this earlier era to the strategy the European Union pursues in 
relation to Russia . In essence the European Union remains a civilian power, but pursues a 
policy linked to the architecture of both former Soviet Union and the American Alliance 2 
New Thinking in International Relations 
The collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the consequent dissolution of 
the Soviet Union seemed like a revolution to many observers in the West. 3 The downfall of 
communism called for new approaches and actions by scholars and practitioners of 
international relations. But solutions both to assess and analyse the new Europe are not easy 
to find. 
It is clear that the restructuring of the international system since the closing of the Cold 
War has created immediate problems and implications in relation to the European integration 
agenda, of which the European Union is the institutionalised core. The study of international 
politics which presently deals with the uncertainty and volatility of the international structure, 
faces many dilemmas but also dichotomies. Increasing globalisation, due to intensified 
interdependency of the economic and political international system, might have created a 
centripetal drive towards greater homogeneity. On the other hand, increasing fragmentation 
and clashing interests operate in a parallel fashion. While there appears to be a shift from 
military means towards economic power (soft power) resources, the term security does 
regresses increasingly to its military dimension4 It appears that actors ' capacities to act 
increase and decrease at the same time, and parallel to this, one can witness the changing 
nature of the state. Deepening international and regional interdependence have spurred states 
to opt for multilateral cooperation as a forum to assert influence through collective 
arrangements in the international arena. 
Within the changing nature of the structure and study of international relations, 
theoretical, public and diplomatic debates about which role the European Union should and is 
capable of pursuing, have intensified. In this debate, key questions are whether the traditional 
borders of state sovereignty can be trespassed as an option to increase the external security of 
the European Union, and what the role of the co-ordinating security and foreign policy 
institutions and regimes are. 
How to analyse EU - Russian relations ? 
Despite the divergent views of whether the European Union can be evaluated as a distinct 
international actor, there nevertheless appears to be a consensus that the role of the European 
Union in the international environment can be evaluated in a number of ways. In examining 
essentially a bilateral relationship, there are two ways in which this could be done. 
First, a concrete and substantive option is to describe and document the two countries' 
policies towards each other in order to reveal the essential goals and strategies pursued by 
these two units in their relationship. Given the fact that information and events, however dense 
and intricate they might be, have occurred in a relatively short time frame, such an approach 
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runs the danger of becoming easily dated. This in turn sets a problems in producing 
generalisable insights into the European Union's role in the international environment. 
It is therefore desirable to complement this contribution with some conceptual 
considerations which have some implications for further theoretical development. Hence 
attention will be placed on the dynamic processes of policy formation, evolution and change 5 
The discussion will be divided into three essential parts. The first part of this article will 
attempt to highlight some conceptual issues regarding the European Union as an entity in the 
international system. The second part focuses largely on an empirical record of the 
EUlRussian relationship, which is based on a review of the past ten years of interactions 
between the European Union and Soviet Union, and after 1991, its legal heir, Russia. The aim 
of the third and the final part of this article is to come to some tentative conclusions about the 
character of this relationship and what this tells us about the development of the EU foreign 
policy toward this important region. 
Foreign and External Policies in Flux 
While the European Union's relationship with Russia must be given at least equal importance 
as the transatlantic relationship, it clearly differs in its nature and content. 
As such, an assessment of the relationship must take into account the changing nature of 
both Russian but also European foreign policy. It needs to be understood that Russian foreign 
policy has, until at least 1993, reflected the internal turbulence and uncertainty which govern 
its society and government. 6 The domestic difficulties associated with the political and 
economic transformations taking place in Russia have produced a high degree of uncertainty in 
the conduct of both domestic and foreign policies. It can be argued that a relatively ambiguous 
and changing Russian foreign policy over the last five years is a reflection of domestic search 
for a post Soviet identity. This important process has taken many currents, often swinging 
from one extreme to the other, from total openness to the West to overt endogenous 
nationalisms, stirring old enemy images.7 These processes of identity formulation and the 
corresponding visions and definitions of Russia's position in the world, have decisive 
influences on the shaping of its foreign policy. 
It is also reasonable to argue that - given its present relatively unstable political 
structures - Russian foreign policy is influenced by the international context. In particular, 
prior to 1993, these institutional weaknesses of the Russian foreign policy making system 
provided little direction for clear success or failure of foreign policies. This allowed multiple 
ideas about the international environment to permeate Russian foreign policy debates. On 
these grounds the argument may be made that the nature of the external environment act as 
powerful influences and factors in determining and shaping Russian foreign policy, as long as 
uncertainty and instability remain high in Russian foreign policy.8 The interaction and 
bargaining at both the domestic and the international level shape the definition of national 
interests, the formulations of policies, and the relative potential for international cooperation 
and conflict. 
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Two level games; albeit of a different nature, are also at play in the decision making process 
concerning the European Unions' actions towards third actors. Here the issue one needs to 
address concerns the fact that a genuine European foreign policy as it was initially formulated 
by the European Union has not come into existence. In essence the character of the European 
Union's relationship with third states remains sui generis in nature and cannot be compared to 
either national foreign policies, or the role which multilateral institutions traditionally assume 
in the international environment. This has been an important predicament for scholarly inquiry 
in this area of European integration An additional caveat to be applied here is that in fact Title 
J5 in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) is presently not a clear reflection of the 
diversity of approaches by which member states would like to see the European Union act. 
But such conceptual puzzles and predicaments have not restrained students and 
practitioners of European integration to assess and to analyse where the barriers of a genuine 
and full fledged CFSP lie. It is by all means difficult to establish whether the fact that member 
states do co-ordinate their foreign policy for the sake of European Foreign Policy has a 
significant impact on third states IO For example, Christopher Hill's work has established a 
framework which has spurred considerable case research. II In proposing a framework to 
question actor-like characteristics of the European Union by outlining the gap between 
capabilities (the ability to agree necessary resources and instruments at its disposal to act) of 
the European Union as a foreign policy actor on the one hand and expectations (demands) by 
potential recipient states on the other. In mapping out which capabilities a foreign policy actor 
should possess, he comes to the worthwhile conclusion that there is a fundamental gap 
between capabilities and expectations, and prefers to label the dialogue between the EU and 
the world as a system oj external relations. 12 
Questions and frameworks such as the above raise a pivotal question about Europe and 
its institutional core in regards to third actors. The fact that the EU is often not seen as a 
series of ad hoc mechanisms but rather as a seamless web of 'Europeanness', has been 
addressed by Allen and Smith in 1990.13 In recognising specific problems in the evaluation of 
the European Union in a statist perspective, the authors have shifted the definition of the 
European Union from that of an international actor to that of a variable and multi-
dimensional presence, which might have more important roles to play in some issues than in 
others. The work is significant since it integrates an important factors formerly neglected in the 
study of the European Union's foreign policy. It implies that the EU is an institutional 
phenomena, but also an economic and cultural one. The way in which the new Europe defines 
and legitimises its presence within these dimensions has a fundamental impact on the shaping 
of its relation with ' Others '. 
Definitions of 'Self and 'Other' in Europe 
The issue concerning self-(re)definition of Europe provoke the controversial question of how 
and where to set its boundaries, 14 can be roughly translated into the practice of the politics of 
inclusion and exclusion. Specifically in reference to Russia, the interchangeable use of 
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denoting Europe as a way of either describing Europe's cultural boundary (the idea of Europe) 
and the EU's institutional boundary (the EU as an actor) and where Europe's security 
boundaries are to be drawn (NATO, WEU, Partnership for Peace), have given rise to 
misunderstandings and confusion for both policy makers and scholars alike. 
As a whole, the present, past and probably future search for Russilln identity does not 
rest in easily identifiable cultural traits but in relations,15 hence questions of where and how 
borders towards ' the Other' should be drawn become crucial. In fact, Russian self-definition 
and its relevance to Europe has been a focus of debate for centuries. During the seven decades 
following the 1917 upheaval, Russia consistently promoted the myth of its central role as a 
champion of internationalism in world politics. In this way it latched on to a pro-European 
political debate - and policy - which can be dated to Peter the Great. On the other hand, 
Catherine the Great, who cultivated the ideas of Enlightenment, championed the idea of a 
centralised state to protect the Russian Empire. Accordingly, until today, the Western 'Other' 
has been a volatile concept in Russian identity constructions. The meanings of 'Europe' are 
used as to distinguish it from the 'West' , notably the United States of America (and NATO). 
The Russian relationship to the USA in its rhetoric is characterised by love and hate, whereas 
those with Europe are approached with symbolic gesturing. As indicated beforehand, the way 
in which Russia will interpret the ' Other' is closely interrelated to the difficulty in coming to 
terms with the challenges of a changing concept or Russian identity and in which way it 
integrates the idea of Europe in that process. This is not because there is no 'Russian idea' but 
rather that there are many of them. It is the above mentioned identity 'crisis ' which has tended 
to reactivate the age old Russian ambiguity vis a vis Europe and the West at large. 16 
The issue of identity 
'Collective Identity,' according to Bill Mc Sweeney in the Review oj International Affairs, 'is 
first a matter of perception, just as security and insecurity also begin in our perception of 
vulnerability,17 From a general historical viewpoint, the very idea of Europe and its identity 
has been defined at large through images of foes . The present post cold war readjustment of 
countries in western, eastern and central Europe signifies an attempt to surmount the former 
'frontiers' of Europe, and the division between the east and the west. European Others have 
changed over time; the present political processes might well be conducive to further changes, 
or manifestations of the imagined borders where Europe lies . 
In addition, any thinking about European identity has both political and cultural 
dimensions which, inextricably linked and owning many nuances, are difficult to define in a 
quantitative way. It is essential to recognise that European identity centres on the idea of the 
Other, where the national 'We' is mirrored itself in the 'Them' which from any national 
perspective makes up the larger part of the world . 18 This is important to realise because it is 
here where the European Union as a Presence will find the major part of its justification, its 
naturalisation, but also, its claim for existence. Hence in the context of interpreting the 
European Union's external relations, the images about Otherness might both drive but also 
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inhibit collaborative behaviour between the east and the west; between Russia and the 
European Union. 
The point in clarifying this issue is that the following study divorces the cultural and 
institutional dimension of Europe and as such carries three important conceptual 
considerations: European identity and International identity, the European Union and its 
external capacity from within, and the upgrading of its external presence. 
European identity and European international identity 
The first point refers to the idea oj Europe in the formulations of identities for both third 
states on the one hand, and those of the EU itself. The above discussion should have pointed 
out that the integration of the idea of Europe in Russia's identity search forms an important 
basis of a consciousness of common interests and common values between the European 
Union and Russia. This might well promote the setting up of common frameworks and 
institutions, which also point to the formation of an international society.'9 In this vein, it is 
not merely sufficient to view European external relations as a totality of individual policies, 
nor as a diffuse idea of what Europe represents . Rather, the European Union needs to be 
analysed as a distinct unit of identity, which represents discrete capabilities, outputs, and 
strategy formulations. It is for this reason that it is useful to view the European Union as 
possessing both a European identity and a European international identity. While the first 
term relates to how the both Europe is interpreted by its citizens and reflects a value system, 
as well as a largely cultural and historical concept,20 the latter concept refers to a more 
exclusive concept, namely establishing how the presence of the European Union in the 
development of a system of relations is received by others. The term European International 
Identity reflects perceptions regarding the European Union in the international system which 
might or might not be overlapping with those of Europe at large. The prime reason why it is 
employed here is to assess to what extent the European Union - as analysed as an institution -
possesses a distinct presence, and accordingly how its interests are perceived by Others. In 
general it reflects the discourse but also actions on the part ofthe Russian and EU political and 
intellectual elite. 
One pertinent example of how the interpretations of the role of the European Unions by 
'Significant Others' are often confused and misunderstood, can be found in Russian foreign 
policy rhetoric. As mentioned above, this rhetoric swings and fluctuates from openness and a 
cooperative stance to antagonistic and increasingly ambiguous foreign policy messages. These 
messages undoubtedly reflect the Russian wish to reassert itself on the international political 
scene, after having to experience the devastating effects of economic shock therapy strongly 
advocated by the West. They are also a response to the tightening of European security 
structures, especially those of NATO. On the other hand, these messages should not be simply 
interpreted as a refusal by Russia to integrate in the new international system. In fact, 
antagonistic messages could well be indicators of how to achieve this goal. 21 
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External capacity from within 
Correspondingly, no conclusions can be drawn about the EUlRussian relationship if we cannot 
distinguish the role of the EU Commission in fulfilling an autonomous and executive function 
for policies and strategies which might have developed both from pillar one issues or genuine 
CFSP issues. As Jupille and Caporaso point out in this volume it is the 'corporate' rather than 
the 'collective' identity which matters. One example here refers to the association of the sole 
will and actions of Germany,22 or those interests defined by the European contingent of the 
G7. This issue has also some significance regarding the relationship of the EU towards third 
states. Both as a gradual and dynamic process, where the EU's internal institutional 
capabilities may slowly adapt to new realities which will give it a greater capacity to deal with 
them. Such assumptions reflect a neoliberal institutionalism approach which accepts a learning 
capacity for institutions 2 3 As a result, internal integration might provide a greater incentive for 
cohesive integration of the individual foreign policies of each member state. It could be 
accordingly argued that individual interests represented within the European Union are 
influenced by the feedback relating to the EU's international identity in the world provided by 
third actors2 ' 
A case in point here refers to the dense network of interests and sectors the EUlRussian 
relationship exhibits. This has resulted from agreements and commitments concluded not 
solely by the Commission Directorate General for external Relations (DGI, in particular 
DGIA)as one would expect, but also under competence of other DG's (dealing for example 
with nuclear energy, energy, environment, scientific cooperation etc.) . 
As such, competence on certain matters regarding the EUlRussian relationship are not 
always entirely clear, and might be a sources of portfolio competition within the Commission. 
In addition multiple competencies produce a certain level of confusion to third actors about 
where to find suitable interlocutors. The Commission initially responded to this issue by 
recruiting functionaries from DG VIII (Development) to deal with all issues on technical 
assistance to the former USSR Given the increasing scope of the EUlRussian relationship this 
reflects only a short term solution. 
Upgrading its external presence 
A third conceptual imperative in viewing the EU and its own international identity refers to 
how the European UnionlRussian relationship has attributed to the EU's role in the 
international multilateral scene. In essence this supposes that contextual factors have a 
powerful influence in upgrading the credibility and international identity of the European 
Union. Not only does this refer to the issue, procedural and output cohesion, addressed by 
Jupille and Caporaso in this volume, but also to the internal competence and efficiency of the 
Community institutions to deal with new policy issues. Consideration of such entails an 
awareness by the observer of how the European Union might be seen as an actor in its own 
right, not only by (in this case) Russia, but also how other actors respond to its capacity in 
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dealing with it. This can act as an influence to both strengthen (if seen as a capable actor) or 
weaken (if seen as an incompetent actor) its autonomy and international identity. 
Viewing the European Union as an autonomous entity, possessing both distinct 
competencies or capabilities, make it also necessary to consider the internal dynamics of the 
European Union. As will be shown in the case study below, internal competence and 
willingness of Community institutions other than the Commission such as the European 
Parliament or the European Court of Auditors, might both act as barriers or as catalysts to the 
role of the European Union in the World Community. That is to say that some inadequacies on 
the external level, as for example a slow implementation of technical assistance can be 
attributed to internal inefficiency, a lack of dialogue or a slow interaction process between the 
responsible Community institutions. 
In this way, the EU's presence in the world derives from a complex set of internal and 
external dimensions and interactions. These issues should be taken into account in 
understanding the actual record of the EUlRussian relationship. 
The Record of EU Ostpolitik 
In all respects it would be difficult to argue that the European Union has taken a passive 
stance towards those states which belonged to the former USSR. In fact there are some who 
argue that abrupt changes in the international system have catapulted the EU into leadership25 
especially in Eastern Europe. The following description focuses on the process of 
rapprochement developed by the ED. This has been largely based and executed from DGI, and 
gives reason to argue the European Union is in the process of developing a new European 
Ostpolitik. 
The Cold War: From Ignorance to Adaptation to Realities of the new Europe 
Not long after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the European Community was soon 
confronted with strong opposition from the USSR. Essentially during the Cold War American 
support towards European integration was seen as an effort to create a counterweight to the 
Soviet threat, as an 'annihilation of the internal communist threat'26 in Europe. As such, the 
construction of the EEC could only be seen as an economic arm ofNA TO. In other words, the 
attitude of the US SR was that in bipolar competition, Europe should not have a sphere of 
influence. 
If there was a debate which preoccupied the foreign policy elite of the Soviet Union in 
the 40s and 50s, it concerned itself with the question to what extent the European Community 
could be seen as an accessory of American imperialism. Most of Soviet apprehension was 
largely based in politico-military terms: an example of this is the little attention that was paid 
initially to the Schuman Plan, while the treaty setting up a European Defence Community was 
a sin in the eyes of the Soviet Union.27 In light of the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, 
both the' aggressive character' of the Euroatom treaty and the legal personality of the EEC 
were denounced by the Soviet Union and consequently ignored. 
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It was clear that the creation of an internal market, aiming towards a Common Agricultural 
Policy, the development of external relations, as well as the attraction of the EEC to its 
neighbours, posed the threat of total exclusion of the USSR. Essentially, such efforts did 
destroy any hope to create pan-European cooperation to further harmonious development of 
international relations, which was one of the major objectives initially followed by the USSR 28 
It was not by coincidence that tbe creation of the Warsaw Pact 29 was complemented in 
1966 by an encompassing plan on Economic Cooperation. The creation and the subsequent 
reinforcement of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, (CMEA)30 can be read as a 
clear sign that the Soviet Union unwillingly felt the imperatives of European integration and 
recognised the first signs of the EEC's international identity. The EEC, for its part, did little to 
counter the bloc image and reinforced its boundaries with the East by instigating the Common 
Commercial Policy (art 113)31 
In addition the successive enlargements of European Economic Community in the 70 's 
and the creation of the European Parliament reinforced the Soviet perception that a more 
functional approach in its foreign policy conduct was required. 
To soften the East-West divide, the European communitarian project needed to be 
accommodated by Soviet foreign policy; one way how this could be achieved was to recognise 
its economic realities, which were seen as 'objective' factors of European integration. The 
only way for the Soviet Union to reintegrate back into the international system was to take a 
multidimensional approach32 As such formal bilateral relations with Europe could reinforce 
both the USSR and the EU and could thus weaken the Atlantic Alliance. 
The first efforts toward a commercial agreement between the Soviet Union and the EEC 
were responded to positively by both, and resulted in meetings between the Commission and 
the USSR33 However, these first bilateral efforts soon failed, since the EEC would not 
recognise its proclaimed counterpart, the CMEA. Essentially the CMEA was seen as a 
promoter of separate bilateral cooperation with each of the individual member states rather 
than as a promoter of relations between the two trade organisation blocs. The twelve remained 
firm in expressing their will to have the reality of the EEC as a whole recognised, but also 
wanted at the same time to reduce the dependency from the Eastern European Countries on 
the CMEA. 34 The EEC acted accordingly in suspending the official contacts between the EC 
and the Soviet Union until October 19803 5 
Another strategy taken by the USSR to disregard the realities of the EEC and 
circumvent negotiation with it was to seek cooperation in the multilateral scene, notably within 
the CSCE. The Soviet Union attempted to use the basket rr36 as a forum for negotiations for 
commercial questions. However, also here the EEC forced the Soviet Union to recognise its 
presence, in acting on behalf of its six and later the nine member states on basket II issues. This 
undoubtedly contributed to the realisation that the EEC had an agenda setting role and a given 
mandate provided for by its member states. Moscow witnessed the signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act 37 in 1975 by A. Moro, acting both in the Community's capacity in his presidency as 
well as a representative ofItaly. 
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Seen in retrospect it appears that the Soviet Union's desire to reintegrate in some form in the 
international system, required that it accept the realities of the EEC. Seeking such a strategy, 
cooperation could potentially promote the status of the USSR in the increasingly tense bipolar 
system. But this also meant that the USSR recognise the EEC needed as an economic but also 
as a political entity. Gradually European integration was seen less as having imperial 
tendencies but than a peace-building system with economic benefits. 
New Thinking and Rapprochement - the Return to Europe 
The Soviet 'New Thinking' period of the 80's, can be viewed as a reaction to the realities of 
the international system and the Soviet Union's increasing interdependence. These 
circumstances demanded either a policy of forced retreat or could be seen as an attempt to 
assert influence in the world by changing its domestic situation. It is clear that the return to the 
world economy was one of the most important interests of the Soviet Union in order to avoid 
economic collapse. Taking these interests into account, the EC had to be regarded as an entity 
with common or complementary, rather than hostile, interests. This led the Soviet Union to 
view the EC as a partner in mutual accommodation. This in tum evoked expressions of an 
integration of the cultural elements of Europe: the notion of the 'Common European House' 
was intended to reflect common historical experiences, cultural traditions, economic rationale, 
and new geographic realities, all of which became a cornerstone for the Soviet Union's post-
1985 foreign policy attitude. In addition there appeared to be an increasing concentration on 
its close neighbours: the EC was seen as an obvious partner. It is here where we can observe 
the beginnings of a dual perceptional problem which continues until today: The EC could be 
seen as a logical enhancement of a notion integrated in the 'new thinking ', but it could be 
viewed as a barrier to the return to 'civilisation,' and the opening between the East and the 
West. From the Atlanticists's perspective, and to the mind of some decision makers within the 
European Union, the policy most favourable to Russia's own interests seems to be the pursuit 
of integration which entails a respect for political and economic international standards. Such a 
strategy would allow Russia to deepen its dialogue with its Western neighbours. 
In the mid 80s the New Thinking era was reinforced by a period of intensive 
preoccupation with the European question by the mezhdunarodnik'8 (which did not preclude 
an intensive russophile discourse) . Lukin had remarked at that time that ' the bloc image had 
been overtaken by events'.'9 It was then that the idea of Europe and European identity 
returned as a priority in the public and official debate. While Europe was still regarded as a 
part of the capitalist West, contours of the European Communitys' international identity 
appeared, since cooperation with the EC became now a real option, and it could be seen as an 
important political partner for its foreign policy. To signify the desire of the USSR 'to rejoin 
Europe' and to show its cultural roots, the year 1987 was labelled the 'Year of Europe' . By 
displaying and professing its European identity, these strategies brought together multiple 
thinkers to reflect about which position the USSR should take towards the European 
Community. It is evident that this rapprochement was based on the conviction that glas'nost 
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needed to co-construct with the European Community a system of international securit/o in 
order to survive. In this way the best method to deal with an enemy was to turn him into a 
friend, the worst would be to make him an ordinary neighbour. 41 Such domestic debates and 
preoccupations help to explain some of the first elements of the European Ostpolitik, which 
included invitations to Brezhnev and later Gorbachev to visit Brussels with the latter visiting 
the European Parliament in 1985 . 
In addition, the ideological relaxation and the consequences of the 'New Thinking' was 
felt in 1985 after the visit to Moscow by Bettino Craxi (the Italian premier). It was then 
Gorbachev officially recognised both the political and the economic consequence of Europe's 
communitarian construction.42 
This loosening of tension and ideological boundaries resulted in the proposal by Sytchov 
(the Secretary General of CMEA) to re-establish official relations between the CMEA and the 
Community which concluded in a solemn declaration. The dialogue continued between the 
Commission and the State Commission of the USSR until February 1989, allowing for a 
strategy to embark on an exploratory phase. 
As a consequence the Commission saw it fit to submit a set of directives for commercial 
economic and business relations to the Council, the content of which had yet to be decided'3 
Consequently, the Commission also accommodated the interests of the Soviet Union in 
tolerating specific agreements with the CMEA members and the Community in recognising the 
bilateral relations which already existed between the their member states and those of 
Community. To follow such a strategy allowed the Community a certain bargaining space to 
conduct negotiations with Eastern Europe without being severely constrained by Moscow. 
It was already by 1989 during the period of Perestroika when the first agreement with 
the USSR on trade and commercial and economic cooperation was signed. Initially reactive 
and pragmatic in nature rather than a than a mobilising project, forming a foundation for future 
agreements. 
Thus, during the late 80s throughout the end of 1993 the European international 
identity was shaped by the factors of ideological transformation in the Soviet UnionlRussia. 
Cooperation with the EC was seen as an attractive foreign policy option which had no 
immediate dangers. The relatively weak political cooperation structure, and its largely civilian 
nature, prevented a potential military threat toward the USSR. However, the issue of political-
military cooperation within the EC was received with serious doubts on the part of the USSR. 
It is here where a second pre-cursor to present attitudes can be seen: a security identity where 
the US remained was seen as a serious impediment for opening a dialogue for any new 
security schemes on a Pan-European Structure. 
The events of the 1980s demonstrated also the process that rapprochement was 
rationalised in the USSR by focusing on cultural imperatives. Emphasis was placed on a 
constructive approach, interests were based on the learning experience, accruing from 
cooperation. Certainly there was a clear bifurcation of opinions in the debate on Europe, and 
also evidence of the growing criticism of Russia's unequivocal attachment to Western values. 
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It is here where the question reverted to where the place of the European Russian was exactly 
in the structure of the European Other, namely the European Community. Therefore, the 
processes of Glas'nost and Perestroika, which led to the collapse of the Soviet and the 
Communist empire, deepened and continued the debate as to how the former USSR, 
particularly Russia should 'fit itselfin' with Europe. 
Disintegration and Integration in the Reshaping of Europe 
The period between 1990 and 1993 could be described as the decisive years of the EUfRussian 
relationship which produced the first outputs and indicated a rapprochement by a way of an 
Ostpolitik. It signified an era of change both for the EU - which responded to the new realities 
in preparing and ratifYing the Treaty of European Union (TEU) and the consequent 
formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) - and a policy of openness by 
the newly establishing Russian Federation. At the same time, this period signified both internal 
and external institutional adaptation to new realities and in parallel displayed also the 
decisiveness to put forward an international identity as part of the European idea. 
As discussed before, the Atlanticist approach taken by Russian foreign policy was driven 
by the desire to find its way back to civilised society, gaining further personal and economic 
freedom, sound functioning of democratic institutions, and a full array of mechanisms of the 
civic culture formerly reserved to the West. The European Community incorporated all these 
values, and thus, the corresponding deepening of integration in the late 80s was seen as a 
favourable process, to which Russian foreign policy could open itself . 
In 1990, the European Community, after having sent a group of economic experts, 
decided that economic reform would be one of the ways to stabilise the transition period for 
the former USSR. Following visits from President Gorbachev 's advisors to the European 
Commission, Brussels began to see its opportunities to make its international identity felt. The 
fact that the USSR was trying to recognise and cope with the multiple changes in the 
international system and the end of the Cold War, could give the European Community a 
leadership niche44 ifit could respond adequately to the changing political situation in Moscow. 
It therefore took the initiative to work towards a new cooperation agreement and 
correspondingly set up a joint committee consisting of both EC and USSR officials. In 
addition the Commission decided to open an official EC delegation consisting of five 
functionaries in Moscow in the spring of 1991,'5 which was a strategic but also a dangerous 
tactic. An agreement from the EC side to set up common embassies for the former Soviet 
Union could not be found. The recognition of the European Community in the diplomatic 
sphere could have been a countermove against the perceived pressure by the US towards other 
powers to work towards the collapse of the USSR as a superpower. It is interesting to note 
that at that time, a KGB file authored by Vladimir Kryuchov issued to the President, Mr. 
Gorbachev stated : [ ... ] 'the stability of the political situation in the country today, also depends 
to a significant extent on the international position of the USSR' but [ .. .]' according to reliable 
information, the United States is putting pressure on Japan and Western Europe to limit the 
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possible scale of their cooperation with the USSR' the strategy should therefore be [that] 'in 
the international arena it is important to do everything possible in order to mitigate the 
acuteness of the situation that is taking shape around the USSR046 
In setting up its diplomatic representation the European Community made sure to 
communicate what the idea of Europe and cooperation - both in the European and in the 
international context - entailed. As Michael Emerson, head of the EC delegation in Moscow 
remarked in an international conference on the European idea and European civilisation that 
year: ' Institutions matter. That is also part of the European idea. It is also prepared to defend 
the argument that the other qualities of the European idea [ ... ] - openness and diversity 
combined with increasingly intense integration - require a sufficient common force to avert 
either hegemonies or centrifugal tendencies ' . 47 As such, it appeared that international identity 
of the European Community was increasingly recognised and understood by Moscow. In some 
ways the European Community was considered a model for the Soviet Union in 
transformation. This was stressed in visits by Gorbachev and by President Yeltsin during his 
visit in April to the Socialist group to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Particularly 
during the Moscow August 1991 coup, it was noted by the head of the EC delegation, 
Michael Emerson that interest in '[ .. . ]copies of the Treaty of Rome became intense' .4s 
Along with increased efforts and arguably the efficiency of the Community to negotiate 
both on technical and political concerns with Russia arose also interest in the developments 
towards deepening European integration, in particular in regarding to the progresses made in 
terms of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. As Kozyrev stated :[ .. .]' the prospects of 
ratification directly affect our external political and economic interest. Internal stability and 
peace, and the dynamism of the Community's development, will, to a great extent, determine 
the nature, depth and real possibilities of our cooperation and joint action with the EC [ .. .]'49 
First responses and outputs and new assertiveness 
Following the conclusions of the Rome European Council in December 1991, the European 
Community and its member states increased their efforts to strengthen and establish a working 
relationship with Moscow, while at the same time supporting a dissolution of the USSR. It 
was the EC's support for independence for the Baltic countries which the created first frictions 
between Brussels and Moscow5o One can also see in this issue the first contours of a policy 
line taken by the Commission. 
In order to formulate ways and methods how Europe could assist in the peaceful 
transformation of the former Soviet Union, an active shuttle diplomacy involving visits to the 
Baltics, Ukraine and Russia by the Community Troika, members of the European Parliament, 
and also by many European heads of state evolved. 
The European Communitys support for the independence of, and association with 
Eastern and Central Europe and the Baltics was initially responded by cautious stance by the 
Moscow leadership, but cooperation continued in exploratory talks. The creation of a system 
of triangular operations in order to establishing credit guarantees amounting to $10.2 billion, 
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for the export of agricultural and food products; was a method of aid welcomed by Moscow. 51 
On the other hand, funds for emergency food aid, technical assistance, as well as short and 
medium terms loans in total amounting to roughly one billion ECU's, could only released after 
some considerable delay.14 The reason was largely due to the resistance in Moscow of the 
movements towards independence of the Baltic States. By December 199 I, the European 
Council pledged substantial funds for food aid and technical assistance for temporary relief, 
granting 200 million ECU's worth of food and medical supplies as a response to appeals for 
emergency help by the mayors of St. Petersburg and Moscow. The EC remained firm in 
exerting influence by attaching to its political objectives: the events associated with the Soviet 
military pressure in the Baltics, resulted in an initial suspension of programmes concerning 
food aid and technical assistance. 55 
Vice President Yananev remarked that the Soviet-European relationship had cooled as a 
result of such unfriendly gestures 56 while President Gorbachev succeeded in persuading the 
West that the Baltic events had not been a reversion to old ways but only a passing 
disturbance to his pursuit of reform and enlightenment. The European Urrion suspended its 
help for the second time during the August coup in 199 I, when the political future of the 
Soviet Urrion became so uncertain. 59 
On the level of declaratory diplomacy, the twelve member states of the EC produced by 
the end of 1991 a declaration on guidelines for recogrrition of new States in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Urrion, with the objective of providing the foundation for its future relationship 
with the dissolving USSR. In this way it was prepared to adopt a statement indicating its 
readiness to recogrrise eight republics of the CIS by the time the Soviet Urrion officially ceased 
to exist (1.2.1992). In 1992 Russia took over the former Soviet Mission to the European 
Community in Brussels. The sigrrificance Yeltsin attached to this post is exemplified by his 
appointment ofIvan Siliayev, the Soviet Prime Mirrister after the August coup, as a permanent 
representative to the European Commurrity.60 
In sum, the uncertainty of the political scene during the end of 1991 and 1992 in Russia 
made it difficult for the European Commission to work on a set of strategies regarding Russia. 
Furthermore, it was soon realised by the Commurrity that technical cooperation needed to be 
complemented by a political dialogue. It pursued this under the umbrella and in preparation of 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. 
Post Cold War Europe and Russia: towards Partnership 
Deepened and ambitious cooperation strategies within a rapidly changing international political 
environment entailed for the EU both institutional adaptation and learrring, but also capacity 
and credibility-building in the multilateral fora. For Russia, the EC was its prime ally in its 
effort to integrate in the international political system. 
Indeed, the new orientation of the European Community towards the East and the 
Russian rapprochement toward Europe and the European Urrion in particular provided 
important frames of reference in which state building was pursued for Russia and integration 
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furthered for the European Union. The EU Ambassador to Russia Michael Emerson remarked 
in 1994 : 
'Thus the twin magnetic poles of Europe- centred in the EU and Russia - began also to 
see their powers and attraction tidy up the geographic organisation of post Cold War Europe. 
Increasingly more countries formerly part of the USSR now look to Europe. Russia desires to 
playa full part in European civilisation, as well as to reverse much of the recent disintegration 
of its links with other CIS countries, and the EU had important interests in building deeper 
links with Russia, in addition to pursuing its own integrationd1 
Internal and External Institutional Adaptation 
'[ ... ](W]e must start again from zero [ ... ] 'we had a structure and it is not working,.62 So 
noted the Commissions' Vice President Andriessen in reference to implementing goals with 
the changing Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to frustration in the 
Commission since, as Andriessen put it, one had to work on the basis of ' bricolage.63 It was 
repeatedly noted that the Commission's human resources were inadequate to work with such 
an enlarged and complex portfolio. The ill-prepared functionaries with little diplomatic 
experience faced the problem of finding suitable interlocutors in order to establish a dialogue 
and to practically negotiate methods of implementing the decision of the Council of Rome.64 
Despite these shortcomings, it appeared that its capacity to act was soon recognised by other 
third actors. The European Community was increasingly seen as a capable interlocutor, not 
only continued and heavy interaction in forms of visits by the Commission to Moscow, but 
also in the multilateral setting such as the G7 and the World Bank. 
Within the G7 framework both member states of the Community (most notably Germany 
and the United Kingdom), and Commission President Delors stressed the need for the 
international community to integrate Russia and to enlarge the G7 to a G8 at least on the 
political level. The G7 took an active role and co-operated with the Community in the 
assessment and co-ordination of aid and loans given to the former USSR. The financial 
commitment which the European Union gave to the former Soviet Union, amounting to 80% 
of total humanitarian aid to Russia, gave the Community a certain kind of recognition, as it 
also represented the interests of those member states who were not formally included in the 
G7 negotiations. In addition, the European contingent of the G7 used also agreements with 
other third states, notably the United States to show its presence. By calling on the spirit of the 
Transatlantic declaration it promoted the European Union's international identity, while also 
making clear that as a partner, the United States had some responsibilities to fulfil toward the 
Soviet successor states. Such demands were to some extend and hesitantly complied to . 
Previous to the first aid coordination conference organised by the U. S., the Council President 
Pinheiro recalled that the EC provides 80% of the humanitarian aid to the USSR, and that the 
role of the EC in its own right should be emphasised. President Bush declared at the opening 
of Washington aid conference to top the US contribution of $ 645 million, to put a halt to the 
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European criticism of the inconsistency between the U.S . convening the conference and the 
size of the initial US contribution6 5 
In recognising the European Community's capacity to act it received the mandate to 
organise a follow up conference on aid in Lisbon the same year, in which the Russian side 
expressed its wish to be included in the preparatory work . 66 Furthermore, the Community was 
included in the workings of the World Bank, to ensure efficiency in the co-ordination of 
international aid. Particularly during 1992, when quick reactions by the international 
community to market changes within Russia occurring were needed, the Commission received 
the mandate to consolidate the Community ' s programme for technical assistance. 
Towards Partnership and Cooperation: 
With the aim of conducting a political dialogue, the European Union instigated negotiations 
for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement by the fall of 1992.67 The EU came to realise 
that Russia could offer immense opportunities. The EU IS is Russia's main trading partner, 
with a trade volume of $ 31.123 million as compared to {;hina, the USA and Japan taken 
together, amounting to $ 10.835 million 6 8 Yet, the building of Partnership and the 
Cooperation Agreement proved to be a difficult enterprise, not at least because it has been 
from the beginning very ambitious in its content and scope. In the second round of bilateral 
negotiations it was accepted that the new relations between the European Union and Russia 
needed to be based on common values. 69 While both parties confirmed and reaffirmed 
consistently their will to conclude negotiations, divergences between the European Union and 
Russia persisted, in particular to the clause regarding human rights and the provisions to be 
applied to the exchange of goods in sensitive sectors. 
Russia viewed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement as a way to integrate itself 
into the international political system, in particular in reference to trade issues. Russia stressed 
the need to no longer be considered as a centralised state planned economy but as an equal 
partner and demanded from the EC that it must be treated on equal footing with GATT 
countries . The EC for its part was not willing at that time to grant complete access to GATT 
type trade policy rules to Russia, whose cost and price structures where not transparent 
enough and where some industries could inflict severe damage on EC producers. Three 
meetings between EC leaders and President Yeltsin had ended without fundamental 
agreement. In the end the bargaining focused on primarily economic issues, and, after two 
years of negotiation the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed in Corfu in June 
1994. It is here when Yeltsin made the grand statement that 'Our country has made a strategic 
choice in favour of integration into the world community, and, in the first instance, with the 
European Union, .70 While the agreement is still pending ratification of the national 
parliaments71 of the member states of the European Union, the PCA (valid for an initial period 
of ten years) spells out important rules of trade and business with Russian principal economic 
partners, while creating a body of trade and business law which binds Russia to a combination 
of EU international market law and the international trading system (GATTIWTO) with 
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enough flexibility for future negotiation for a Free Trade Area (planned to start in 1998). It is 
also an agreement on political integration, in the sense that it includes a human rights premise, 
expressed through its suspension clause (Art 170) taken in accordance with international law. 
(This suspension clause was invoked and resulted in a suspension of the interim agreement in 
response to the Russian military response to the Chechnyan crisis). The significance of this 
agreement will be further discussed in the third part of this . 
Parallel to the negotiations of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the 
European Commission implemented the Tacis programme toward the former Soviet Union, 
with the main purpose of using EU economic competence and expertise directed towards 
helping market mechanisms. The Commission sees Tacis as an 'inseparable part of western 
Europe's present and future strategy towards the emerging democracies ' whose main aim is 
'to build bridges' between the East and the West, and to provide 'collective response to a 
collective lesson learned from history' . 72 In its first year Tacis alone amounted to 400 million 
ECU's, even though implementation was severely backlogged due to coordination problems, 
which will be discussed below. Russia is by far the main recipient, in receiving 60% of the 
annual 450 million ECU's. This technical assistance proved to be a powerful tool in the 
relationship between Russia and the European Union. From the total 1, 756.84 million ECU 
contributed to the CIS between 1991-1994, representing 56% of total economic and 
humanitarian aid to the CIS countries, Russia received the largest share: 630.89 million 
ECU73 In justifYing this aid stress was place on the maintenance of 'European' values 
regarding human rights and democracy, by the European Parliament. 
New integrative efforts. With the European Union as its prime advocate, Russia became 
increasingly interested in participating in European Cooperation. Results of this were its 
participation in the EU's Stability Pact conference in Paris in May 1994, its application to 
GATT in March 1994, in 1992 to the Council of Europe (of which it became a member in 
early 1996), and its active membership of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
and the International Monetary Fund (JMF). Cooperative participation with the European 
Energy Charter, and a conclusion of the cooperation agreement with the OECD in June 1994 
can be read as important signs that Russia wants to be seen as a normal state, and as such it 
wants to become an equal partner in the international political fora . Further efforts included 
participation in several regional mechanisms intended to integrate complicated border areas, 
such as the Barents and Baltic See Regional Cooperation Council, seen by the EU as an 
important factor for ensuring that future enlargements of the European Union will not create 
a bloc mentality. In the security and foreign policy field, Russia pushed for an upgrading of the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which transformed into the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in 1994. It is largely the NATO debate 
that remains a source of division for both the Russian President and the EU foreign ministers . 
Action and Support in Uncertainty. The European Union, for its side, showed its 
political character in supporting the status quo of the political leadership in Russia. For 
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example, when the Russian Parliament attempted to strip Yeltsin of his powers, the 
Community continued - in the framework of Political Cooperation - to support President 
Yeltsin. While the political climate slowed down shuttle diplomacy, and postponed meetings 
between Delors and Yeltsin, the Community continued to offer its support and was even 
willing to accelerate negotiations of the partnership agreement. 74 
As a recognition to its efforts and also as a gesture of openness and commitment to 
western values, the foreign Minister Kozyrev invited EU observers for the 1993 elections. The 
European Parliament subsequently approved the funding for technical support for the 
elections. The first EU joint action (under J.3 , Title V of the TEU) was taken on EU election 
observation, in the winter of 1993, at a time when Russia' s political situation was dangerously 
unstable. 
By 1995 the initial international integration of Russia disappeared under a rubble of 
domestic problems as exemplified by numerous banking scandals, and the massive military 
force used in response to the ethnic conflict in Chechnya. Fronts increasingly hardened 
between the East and the West. The war in Chechnya had wide ranging international 
repercussions . After a visit by a delegation led by the Hungarian Prime Minister Kovacs to 
Chechnya, the OSCE protested in Moscow against the violation of human rights . The 
Assembly of the Council of Europe postponed the decision about Russia's membership. The 
response of the European Union, who was backing the OSCE in its fact finding missions, was 
the harshest in suspending the procedure for the signing of the Interim Agreement, an action 
which was supported and called for by the European Parliament. 
Towards Security Concerns 
Multiple signs that the route of Atlanticism and openness slowly abated were also evidenced 
in the production of the 1993 Russian foreign policy doctrine, which demonstrated the re-
emergence of a hardened political will to vocalise strong Russian statehood in tandem with a 
strong nationalistic policy. This became particularly evident in the concept paper ' Strategy for 
Russia' published by the non-governmental Council for Foreign and Defence Policy in March 
1994, which affirmed that Russia must pursue a policy of balancing between the centres of 
power on the also focusing its efforts toward establishing a new security system in Europe.75 
The report which followed the Lisbon conference on aid coordination, demonstrated a 
realisation that the European Union carried only little leverage in the security field , and could 
do little to respond to a more endogenous Russian foreign policy and the hardening of security 
fronts . In a press conference following the first Russian EU meeting after the signing of the 
interim agreement, Commission President Santer stressed that the EU was not to seek to 
' establish a new frontier ' in Europe ,7. and maintained the importance of the Russians' role in 
the construction of a new European Security Architecture. Thus, despite these frictions the 
EU ministers saw the need to strengthen the relationship with Russia further. This became 
particularly evident at the informal meeting of the EU ministers in Carcassone in the Spring of 
1995, who discussed in depth the actual events in Russia .. In general this meeting was 
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important to ensure the member states ' commitment and to upgrade the political dialogue with 
Russia already foreseen in the Partnership Agreement. It was here when the EUlRussian 
strategy exercise was launched, in order to provide an analysis of EUlRussian interests and to 
provide guidelines for policy but also to identify future areas of cooperation in all pillars of the 
TED. Consequently, the Commission produced a Communication to the Council titled 'The 
European Union and Russia: the future relationship.' In doing so, it had for the first time made 
use of the rights of initiative it holds with member states in CFSP under J.8 of the TEU. The 
paper recommends that a political dialogue be established on issues of security, 'comprising 
such questions as NATO enlargement, Partnership for Peace, OSCE strengthening and the 
development of relations between the Russian Federation and the Western European Union,77 
It emphasises in particular a rapprochement and intensified dialogue between Russia and 
NATO in the context of Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC). 
The Russian authorities welcomed this initiative but regretted the lack of consultation in 
the preparation of this document, which in their view was at times lacking in ' clarity, 
substance and comprehension for certain Russian realities ' .'8 They thus proposed that the 
Commission and the Council include Russian experts in the work for concrete and practical 
implementation of the new Community policy towards Russia. The Russian delegation also 
complained that Russia was still not considered a market economy by the EU, and also that it 
was not able to benefit from loans from the European Investment Bank. On the political side a 
greater involvement with the EU and on the WEU on question that affect security and stability 
in Europe was demanded. The process of the action plan exercise is significant as it created a 
dynamic towards an implementation of a concrete working policy with identified actions 
adopted by the General Affairs Council on May 13 . 
Throughout 1995 and 1996, the European Union maintained its technical assistance 
programmes and coordinated with the OSCE the international observations for State Duma 
and Presidential elections, while taking a cautious approach in awaiting the outcome of the 
elections. Perhaps due to the Communist victory in the election of the State Duma, the 
Commission and most of the member states strongly vocalised their support of the candidacy 
of Yeltsin in the Presidential elections, with a view to maintaining the status quo of the 
relations established. During this time, the preparation and setting up of a strategy towards 
Russia a major preoccupation in the political unit in Brussels, while technical assistance and 
support for reform continued to flow into the Russian Federation. 
Due to the ambiguity of the Russian foreign policy, particularly prior to the elections, a 
proactive political dialogue was slowed considerably. Furthermore, actions, such as 
discriminatory legislation for foreigners and legislations on foreign banks which are in 
contradiction of the basic principles set down in the PCA, gave rise to frustration in Brussels 
and in the member states of the ED. Given its relatively limited amount of capabilities, in 
influencing Russian domestic policy, but also due to the member states' desire to take a 'wait 
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and see' approach in the prevailing context of such fluidity and instability, the European Union 
was incapacitated but also less willing to take a more proactive position towards Russia. 
Three 'Pillars ' of the new European Ostpolitik. 
Having reviewed the complex dynamics of the EU-Russian relationship it is useful to outline 
the loci of competence, autonomy and internal capacity in identifying the three main elements 
on which the European Union conducted its relationship with the Russian Federation. 
The first element concerns the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. On a 
fundamental level, the negotiations revolving around the agreement allowed the European 
Union and Russia to reflect on each other's priorities toward each other. It is evident that the 
agreement has not, as Delors noted 'the same physiognomy as an agreement with the US,79 as 
long as the reform process in Russia has not advanced more. But at the same time it was also 
recognised that 'Russia is a great power, and we want agreements with her on the same 
political intensity as with the United States and Japan' . The agreement is of importance 
because it marked a vital change, bringing together key political and economic issues 
previously held separate. Its significance lies in the instigation of a political dialogue on the 
presidential level at least twice a year, a procedure that the EU until then only shared with the 
G7 countries. Furthermore, on Russia 's part, an economic will towards approaching European 
standards and a rapprochement towards the GATT system became apparent. The agreement 
might be seen as a landmark in the relationship between the West and in particular the 
European Union and Russia because many of the provisions set out in the PCA had far 
reaching implication for domestic legislation entailing legally binding obligations. As such it 
brought together the desires of two ' actors ' representing the first part of the new mosaic of 
European and Russian integration of the international system. On the institutional level, the 
agreement also signifies the capability of the Commission to act as a competent interlocutor 
with a third state. Due to its increased interaction with authorities of the Russian Federation it 
acquired increasing autonomy in negotiating this agreement. During the period between 1991 
and 1995 it received mandates to balance the agreement between the desires of the member 
states and Russia. Examples of this are the mandate given by the Council to negotiate a clause 
concerning the establishment of a Free Trade Zone, the content of the democracy clause, and 
also the way in which the Russian economy should be treated by the European Union. Other 
important mandates include specific negotiations in reference to trade and cooperation in 
nuclear materials and issues concerning the banking sector. Due to the largely pragmatic 
approach taken by the Commission as to the conclusion of this agreement, negotiations 
progressed regardless of the political events which took place in Russia. 
The second element concerns the EU's role as an advocate for Russia in the international 
political system, as a way to promote its own international identity. The Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, and (the above) mentioned Communication of the Commission, 
demonstrate that the European Union can be seen as Russia's closest advocate in integrating 
more fully into the international political-economic system including the G7 and the Council of 
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Europe, and the World Trade Organisation. Germany, in particular, has been a strong 
advocate of tying Russia in the international political system. On the other hand, Russian's 
demands to upgrade the CSCE promoted and strengthened the role of the European Union in 
the security arena. The European Union has relied on and cooperated with the OSCE, both in 
the Russian parliamentary elections in 1995 and also in the presidential elections in 1996. In 
regards to the Chechen crisis, the European Union has relied on the OSCE in fact finding 
nusslOns. The European Union' s efforts, in particular the Commission's efforts in 
strengthening and working towards a relationship with the Soviet Union, and later with Russia 
carry implications for the mediation of crises and conflicts. For example, already during the 
Gulf crisis, the European Community recognised that its structure impeded it to play an active 
political role, where political cooperation with the Soviet Union could have been an important 
asset. As van den Broek noted: 'we should perhaps accept the fact that Moscow is better 
placed at this precise moment to have direct discussions with Baghdad than we are in Europe, 
or perhaps even the U.S. but this does not mean that the basic positions are different, .77 
Concerning the Bosnian crisis, the European Union has attempted to promote an integrative 
attitude with the Russian delegation. 
While the European Union and its member states could be seen as the closest allies 
Russia has in regards to its integration with the international system, this process can also be 
viewed as one where the European Union has promoted its own role in the international 
system itself Lastly, the increasing competence of the Commission, which gradually evolved 
into a regular set of interactions with the Russian Federation, has given the European Union a 
profile to allow it to participate more closely in the negotiation, preparation and policy 
formulation of international institutions to support the transformation of Russia. For example 
the European Union has strongly supported the application of Russia to the World Trade 
Organisation. 
The third element relates to issues of institutional cooperation within the framework of 
technical assistance programmes. The establishment of the programmes in 1991 to provide 
economic assistance to the reform process served both as an important policy tool but also 
provided an important function in the promotion of cooperation between the Community 
institutions, in particular between the European Parliament and the European Commission. 
The European Parliament since the 80s has had a very supportive attitude toward promoting 
democratic and economic reform in the former USSR. Later, by having established a 
delegation for relations with Russia, it was able to engage in a constructive dialogue with the 
deputies of the Russian State Duma, and as such it was better informed about current political 
events and trends than the Commission. 
The European Parliament had a considerable interest in the humanitarian aspects of 
Community aid and called for increasing EC financial support from early 1991 .80 As such it 
can be seen as an important influence in ensuring that EU cooperation with Russia reflected 
and communicated a set of European values. The insistence of the European parliament on 
maintaining European practices regarding human rights and democracy provided for the 
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rationale under which the Tacis Democracy Programme was founded. The wish to support the 
political nature of transition and to provide the expertise and know how necessary to support 
the development of democratic practices in the Russian Federation represented a qualitative 
enlargement of the scope of technical assistance. As a 'watchdog' of the expenditures of the 
EU's budget, and thus also of technical assistance, the European Parliament was able to shape 
to influence the content and the outlook of Tacis. While Tacis was beneficial in promoting a 
(at times controversial) debate between the EU institutions, it did however uncover the 
drawbacks of the ' lethargy' of the EU bureaucracy when it comes to agree funding for some 
urgently required technical assistance projects. However, the building of a sense of trust 
between the two institutions is decisive if Community aid needs to be dispensed at short time 
notice. 
It appears that the DGIA and European Parliament delegation for Relations with Russia, 
have strengthened their relationship by more regular contact and consultations. 81 
The expenditure of Tacis funds and the program's management received a certain degree 
of criticism not only from the parliament, but also from the Court of Auditors, as well as from 
some of its beneficiaries. This refers in particular to the slow rate at which commitments and 
payments have been made, the poor liaison between the Commission and contractors to 
execute technical assistance, the poor co-ordination with other donors, and a poor assessment 
of needs of the recipient country. The slow implementation and unrealistic rule setting for 
projects, point to serious shortcomings within the Commission for coordinating the 
programme. Overall, some of these problems are due to with very limited staff resources, but 
also to the low priority given by the Commission to follow up, control and evaluate Tacis 
funds .82 While these problems are fundamental ones from the political point of view, there are 
efforts in the Commission to improve the working methods of this programme. The short time 
frame in which the programme had to develop the expertise and distinct working methods 
acquired during the past six years point to a learning effect and to a more realistic and 
adequate implementation of these funds in the future. An important improvement concerns the 
increasing attachment to the importance of horizontal themes (i . e. technical assistance given to 
sectors not to specific regions only) of the programme, and a considerable increase of staff. 
Lastly, the inclusion of town twinning programmes between the European Union and NIS to 
the programme, and the increased decentralisation of Tacis promote also a rapprochement in 
cultural terms, giving incentives to built networks with cities of the European Union reaching 
beyond technical assistance only. 
Competencies, capabilities - questions and gaps: International Action reconsidered 
The above account should have highlighted that both the content and the quality of the EU-
Russian relationship has contributed to the role of the European Union in the World. As we 
have seen, this relationship has been strongly influenced by historical, but also powerful 
cultural imperatives. As such Russia was, is, and will remain Europe's most 'significant 
Other' . 
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To recapitulate, it might be useful to reflect, on the basis of the three initial conceptual issues 
on pages 10-12 , on how the European Union has developed its new competencies and 
capabilities, in its role as a developing 'international actor ' . The case study gives also rise to 
important questions which need responding to if its 'action gaps' want to be filled. 
Images of' self and ' other' . First of all, in considering in the progress of the EUlRussian 
relationship, it appears that the European Union had an opportunity to strengthen its 
International Identity when both the Russian foreign policy system and the structure of the 
international system showed most flexibility and openness, - this was particularly evident from 
1987 to about 1993. Notably during this time-frame, images about the ' Other' have tended to 
drive collaborative behaviour because the European Union could be seen as an independent 
presence within the newly shaping structure of international relations. 
Particularly during ' the heat of the Cold War' , the Soviet opposition to the EEC and the 
EC was mainly due to ideological competition. European integration then was seen as an 
'accessory' to American imperialism. To a different degree, one can note that the increasing 
association of the EU within the transatlantic security dimension has produced a similar 
behaviour. In this context, mirror images of the European 'We' and the Russian 'Them' might 
have acquired clearer contours, but, at the same time have inhibited collaborative behaviour. 
This creates an obvious and much discussed dilemma: Does the European Union really 
need a strong security and defence identity, whose entanglement with NATO would call its 
international identity back into question? Can a European foreign policy separate itself from 
this dimension? 
Capabilities from within? Hegel claimed: 'An interior with no exterior could itself 
hardly constitute an interior'. The above account should also have shown that external 
capability requires internal competence. The international changes in the political system were 
coupled with a reshaping of the European integration agenda. This provided the European 
Union with a 'competitive advantage' to restructure its internal competencies which allowed 
the Commission to initiate important strategies towards rapprochement. But at the same time 
its initial lack of experience in dealing with a complex external relationship slowed down the 
dialogue to a considerable extent. While this could be attributed in some part to the extremely 
uncertain political situation following the break up of the Soviet Union, the initial lack of inter-
institutional cooperation between the European Parliament and the European Union 
exacerbated this problem. This raises also the much debate of inter-institutional transparency 
and decision making innovation in the context of a European Foreign Policy. 
A workable strategy. Clearly enough, the working towards the conclusion of Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement, provided the European Union with both a strategy and a 
rationale on which it could work with. This final goal provided the means on which the 
relationship could progress. The means were progressively more bargaining mandates to bring 
the negotiations to a close. In using its means (despite some minor drawbacks), the member 
states invested a certain degree of trust to the Commission in its role as a 'diplomatic 
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interface' . As stressed above, this gained the European Union respect within the multilateral 
fora, but also and very importantly to its partner, Russia. 
This raises two issues. First, that the European Union requires also the invested trust not 
only to pursue it ends. Interactions are dynamic and need maintenance in form of a continuous 
dialogue, reaching beyond the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. Second, this also 
points to the pertinent question of whether the European Union would not in future gain from 
being represented by a foreign policy secretary or a 'Mr. and Mrs. CFSP ', which would 
provide partner countries to interact with one distinct authority, rather than multiple diffused 
authorities . 
Future research agendas. Lastly, on a brief note, this case study points out also the 
necessity to respond to new theoretical imperatives concerning the EU's role in the 
international environment. 
This concerns a deepening of the agent - structure debate forcefully put forward 
Carlsnaeus and Smith 83 which might give us clearer directions as to under which condition the 
European Union might be shaped by the international context or its agency, or even both. 
Second, one would benefit from a re-focusing and expansion of the neo-liberal institutional 
approaches. 84 This would give us greater conclusive understanding of how internal 
institutional dynamics influence and shape the European Union's actions in the international 
system. 
Last, and may be most important, because most neglected, we need to open our 
approaches to the concept of culture and the outsiders perceptional attitudes towards Europe 
and the European Union . 8S 
An integration of the above conceptual and theoretical issues will certainly provide a rich 
and exiting research agenda in the examination of Europe and its significant 'Others' . 
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